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Abstract: Radio frequency identification (RFID) tags that meet EPC Gen2 standards are used in many fields such as
supply chain operations. The number of the RFID tags, smart cards, wireless sensor nodes, and Internet of things devices
is increasing day by day and the areas where they are used are expanding. These devices are very limited in terms of the
resources they have. For this reason, many security mechanisms developed for existing computer systems cannot be used
for these devices. In order to ensure secure communication, it is necessary to provide authentication process between
these lightweight devices and the devices they communicate. The authentication process is the first step that allows
the parties to trust each other for communication. Moreover, the authentication protocol should allow simultaneous
verification of multiple lightweight devices. Therefore, grouping proof authentication protocol is required. In this study,
a new grouping proof authentication protocol is developed for lightweight devices. The proposed protocol implemented on
wireless identification and sensing platform passive RFID tag, uses embedded advanced encryption standard encryption
method to encrypt transmitted data. Security of the protocol was first evaluated and verified theoretically, then by a
tool used for automatic verification of security protocols, called Scyther tool.
Key words: Lightweight, wireless identification and sensing platform, grouping proof authentication protocol, security,
Scyther tool, xorshift, xorshiftR+, GPAPXR+

1. Introduction
In recent years, emerging technologies, such as smart cards, radio frequency identification (RFID) tags, wireless
sensor nodes, and the concept of Internet of things (IoT) has brought not only new solutions but also challenges
in their scope of application. The proliferation of devices manipulating or transmitting sensitive and critical
information requires more attention to security issues, because classical security algorithms and protocols cannot
offer effective and feasible security solutions for these groups of devices. Thus, many lightweight cryptographic
algorithms have been suggested in recent literature, including block ciphers [1–7] and hash functions [8–10].
The aim of lightweight security algorithms is to find a balanced solution for performance, speed, and security
needs taking into account limitations such as storage and processing power. There are also lightweight protocols
[11–13] as well as algorithms. One of the most important things for these protocols is random number generator.
Xorshift pseudo-random number generator is a shift register generator, one of the well-known generators in the
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literature, and it was proposed by George Marsaglia [14]. This generator has been developed over time with
modifications. There are many versions of that generator [15]. XorshiftR+ is a pseudorandom number generator
developed over the xorshift class [16]. It was tested with NIST [17–21] and TestU01’s [22] bigcrush tests and it
passed all of them. It was implemented on wireless identification and sensing platform (WISP) passive RFID
tag, and time and resource usage results are compared with those of some other versions of xorshift algorithms.
It was shown to be suitable for lightweight devices.
An authentication protocol is a type of computer communication protocol. It is designed to prove the
identity by transferring required information between the entities. This is the most important protection layer
for secure communication within computer and IoT networks. The ease of identity theft in the virtual world
has led to a search for specific identity authentication methods.
In RFID systems, the group authentication protocol provides a solution that allows for the authentication
of multiple tagged objects. In the real world, the group authentication protocol has gained importance because
tags are used on an increasingly wide range of objects.
In this paper, a new, effective, and lightweight grouping proof authentication protocol is proposed.
This protocol uses the xorshiftR+ pseudorandom number generator that provides a lightweight solution to
generate the random numbers required during communication between the RFID tags and the reader. It
generates the random numbers using the algorithm called xorshiftR+ [16]. Therefore, we called our protocol as
GPAPXR+ derived from the words “grouping proof authentication protocol using XorshiftR+”. This protocol
was implemented and tested on WISP passive RFID tag, and 256-bit advanced encryption standard (AES) was
used to encrypt and decrypt the transported data. We used 256-bit AES on our test device “WISP” because it
has built-in 256-bit AES chip, where 128-bit AES is secure for encrypting nonclassified data. The built-in AES
feature allowed a faster, more scalable solution. We created a new scalable, lightweight, and secure grouping
proof authentication protocol. This proposed protocol is structurally and practically tested on WISP passive
RFID tag, and theoretically tested against the well-known attacks. Moreover, Scyther tool1 was used to analyze
the protocol [23]. According to the analysis and test results, our grouping proof authentication protocol resists
the well-known attacks and is suitable for lightweight devices.
The rest of this article is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses previous and related work. In Section
3, details of material and methods used for the new grouping proof authentication protocol are given. Section
4 gives experimental results of performance, test, evaluation, and discussions. Finally, the paper is concluded
in Section 5.

2. Related work
The literature contains many solutions for the authentication protocol, which is one of the main issues in
the security of the lightweight devices. Studies are currently focusing on ways to overcome these challenges
using innovative solutions. In this study, we examined previous pseudorandom number generator (PRNG)
implementations and proposed grouping proof authentication protocol regarding the performance, statistical,
and security properties.
Rostampour et al. [24] focused on the simultaneous identification of a set of objects tagged using
RFID technology, an approach named RFID grouping proof authentication protocol. Using a method called
authenticated encryption, they created a new authentication method that is scalable and secure. They argued
1 Cremers

C (2014). The Scyther Tool [online]. Website https://people.cispa.io/cas.cremers/scyther/. [accessed 28 May 2020]

3037

AYDIN et al./Turk J Elec Eng & Comp Sci

that this protocol provides message integrity and confidentiality by not exceeding resource constraints for RFID
systems. In the paper, they conducted a theoretical security analysis but do not use any tool such as the Scyther
tool.
Çabuk et al. [16] proposed a new PRNG by modifying well-known xorshift algorithm called xorshiftR+,
after developing many versions of the original xorshift128plus by changing parameters. Finally, three final versions were developed and compared. WISP passive RFID tag was used to implement these algorithms that were
checked according to EPCGen2 standards, and the ENT (defined and detailed on www.fourmilab.ch/random),
NIST, and TestU01 tests. The authors selected the best of the three versions based on the test results, resource
usage and performance.
İbrahim and Dalkılıç [25] proposed a new mutual authentication protocol based on AES and elliptic curve
cryptography (ECC) in the area of healthcare systems. The protocol was designed and implemented on WISP
passive RFID tag. They used WISP passive RFID tag’s built-in PRNG as the random number generator.
However, the new mutual authentication protocol could not satisfy the timing limits of EPCGen2 standard
because of the ECC needs, and also they gave no structural or statistical analysis of the PRNG.
Zhou et al. [26] proposed a secure and scalable grouping proof protocol with an encryption method for
low-power and low-cost devices, functioning in two stages. In the first stage, it checks the group of the tag; in
the second, it verifies the tag’s ID. Encryption in this protocol is used for confidentiality and message integrity.
The ECC is used as the encryption method. This protocol also uses offline approach.
Liew et al. [27] demonstrated a new authentication protocol using grouping proof to minimize the theft
during transport of cargo with tagged items. This protocol provides integrity of all items in the cargo and
transferability of the ownership of the tagged item. Theoretical security analysis of the proposed protocol was
completed. The protocol was not tested on a real RFID system. Moreover, the protocol has not been examined
in terms of time and resource usage.
Zhang et al. [28] proposed a scalable and lightweight grouping proof protocol for RFID tags, which
confirms that a group of tags belong to the same group at the same time. This protocol uses exclusive-or
(XOR) operations and pseudorandom number generation, which makes it suitable for large-scale grouping
proof of lightweight devices. The reader first broadcasts a request message, and all tags around it respond
with response messages. Based on the tag responses, the reader generates a grouping proof. An anticollision
algorithm is used to identify the response messages. The authors used three oracle machines for security proof
and did not test it on a real hardware scenario.
Zhou et al. [29] proposed an ECC-based offline grouping proof protocol. The reader is authorized to
validate the tags without knowing their identities. It is claimed that this approach protects the privacy and
the security of the tags, and defends against replay and impersonation attacks. In offline mode, no continuous
connection between the reader and the verifier is needed, so the reader can proceed the grouping proof operation
without the verifier. After proofing, the reader sends the data to the verifier, making the connection requirement
more flexible. Due to the high resource requirement of ECC, this protocol cannot be used or is hard to run on
lightweight and ultralightweight devices.
Tsai et al. [30] proposed a new grouping proof authentication protocol that enables partial ownership
transfer by guaranteeing the integrity of the tagged cargoes. The protocol was analyzed against the security
attacks theoretically. It is not tested with a tool such as the Scyther tool.
Luo and Yang [31] proposed a high-performance, secure ownership transfer protocol that provides the
capability and security requirements to operate in RFID systems and existing ownership transfer environments.
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They mentioned that their proposed protocol has a resistance to most of the known attacks. They only give
information about confidentiality, replay, man-in-the-middle attacks, forward and backward secrecy, windowing problem, location privacy, asynchronous denial-of-service attack, and performance analysis. There is no
evaluation about partial proof ability, physical disclosure, or cloning attack.
3. Material and methods
To develop an authentication protocol that is effective, secure, and lightweight, it is important to be very
familiar with the characteristics of both the hardware and the environment. For the authentication protocol in
the paper, a new grouping proof authentication protocol was developed using the WISP passive RFID tag with
built-in 256 bit AES encryption, based on the use and modification of proven protocols.
3.1. XorshiftR+
XorshiftR+ is a lightweight and reliable pseudorandom number generator for lightweight devices used as IoT
devices. It was developed by reducing and modifying the operations of the well-known PRNG xorshift+. Three
reduced versions were created and they were implemented on WISP passive RFID tag. TestU01 test suite was
used to measure their ability to generate random numbers. The performance of these three reduced versions
were compared with some other lightweight random number generators. The best version was selected and
called xorshiftR+. XorshiftR+ generator meets the three conditions [32,33] of EPCGen2 standards. It passes
all tests of NIST test suite and TestU01’s bigcrush test.
3.2. Grouping proof authentication protocol using XorshifR+: GPAPXR+
In this section, this new grouping proof authentication protocol is explained. Figure 1 shows the components of
the RFID system implemented by the grouping proof authentication protocol developed within the scope of our
article. Table 1 includes all the notations used in the protocol and Figure 2 shows the protocol. The protocol
developed in this study consists of three phases detailed in subsections.

Figure 1. RFID system components with group authentication protocol applied [34].

RFID tags are located on the objects and the data communication between the RFID tags and the reader
is on insecure air channel. The communication between the RFID reader and the server is assumed to be a secure
connection. The database can be located in the same server or a separated server, and this communication line
should also be secure.
3039
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Table 1. Notations.

kg
kt
IDg
IDt
Nt
Nr
MAC
⊕
E(X, k)
D(E, k)
n
m
i
M2i
IDg i
M4i
M3i

A secret key for the group members
A secret key for the tag
An identification code for the group
An identification code for the tag
Nonce value generated by the tag
Nonce value generated by the RFID reader
Message authentication code
Exclusive or operation
X encrypted with key k using AES
E decrypted with key k using AES
The number of the groups
The total number of the tags
Related tag number of a group
Transmitted M2
Calculated IDg (After decryption)
Calculated M4 (After decryption)
Calculated M3

3.2.1. Registration phase
At this stage, the server initiates the reader, the tags, and the groups with necessary records. Since the
proposed protocol is based on the grouping method, there is a record for each group in the server’s database.
Two encryption keys, group key (k g ), and tag key (k t ) are set in each RFID tag. During the registration phase,
the system behaves as follows: The server database contains a record for each tag. This entry contains ID g ,
ID t , k g , k t , N t , and E (ID t , k t ). In addition, each RFID tag stores ID t , k t , ID g , and k g . Figure 2 shows
the functioning of the grouping proof authentication protocol between an RFID tag, a reader, and a server that
includes a database. This scenario shows steps for one specific group (group ID is “i”).
3.2.2. Authentication phase
In this phase, the tags of the desired group were authenticated by running the following protocol steps below.
Step 1
• The server sends the required information to the RFID reader for the requested group.
• The reader runs xorshiftR+ algorithm and generates 4 random numbers (4 x 64 = 256 bit) and
concatenates them to form the nonce value. This nonce value N r is added to the message package to be sent
to the RFID reader.
• The ID of the desired group and N r are exposed to XOR operation and then the result is encrypted
with k g (desired group key) by using AES-256 and M1 is generated as shown in Eq. (1).
M1 = E (IDg ⊕ Nr , kg )
• M1 and N r are concatenated, and then MAC is calculated.
3040
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Figure 2. GPAPXR+ steps.

• Reader concatenates M1, N r , and MAC, and then broadcasts this information to all tags in its active
field.
Step 2
After receiving the encrypted message, each tag decrypts message M1 using k g , the result and transmitted
N r are exposed to XOR operation and the tag finds the calculated group ID from the message, called ID g ’. It
compares the group ID with the previously stored group ID on its own, and a match shows that the tag is a
member of the desired group. Otherwise, it is verified that the tag does not belong to the group being inquired
by the reader, and the communication is interrupted at this point. If the group ID matches, the tag generates
random numbers using the algorithm xorshiftR+ as the nonce value (N t ). On the tag side, if it is needed, zeros
are appended to the random number for the missing bits and then XOR operation is proceeded by matching
three numbers bit by bit. M2 and M3 are as in Eqs. (2) and (3), respectively:
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M2 = IDg ⊕ Nt ⊕ Nr

(2)

M3 = E(IDt , kt )

(3)

M2 and M3 are encrypted with (k g ) after being exposed to XOR operation.
M4 = E (M2 ⊕ M3, kg )

(4)

The tag calculates MAC from M4 and N t , and then MAC, N t , and M4 are concatenated and sent back
to the reader as the response message.
Step 3
The reader always waits for tag responses. If the response is received, the reader calculates some values
in a loop. In Figure 2, m indicates the number of tags in each group. On the other hand, n indicates the total
number of groups. The reader calculates M2’, M4’, and M3’, respectively as in Eqs. (5–7) for each tag response
separately.
M2’ = IDg ⊕ Nr ⊕ Nt

(5)

M4’ = D (M4, kg );

(6)

M3’ = M4’ ⊕ M2’;

(7)

Then it sends M3’ along with ID g , and N t to the server and waits for a response from the server.
3.2.3. Verification phase
The server retrieves M3’ sent from the reader and searches the database. It compares M3’ with E (ID t , k t )
encrypted value on the database and if it finds a match, it compares the N t value sent by the reader with the
N t value in the corresponding row in the database. If there is a match in N t , the server returns a replay attack
warning, reporting that the nonce value was previously used. When M3 values are matched and if the new
nonce value was not used before, the existing N t value in the database is updated with the new value from the
reader, and the values such as ID t and k t of the corresponding record are returned to the reader.
4. Security analysis of the GPAPXR+
This section contains an analysis of the security level based on various methods of the GPAPXR+. GPAPXR+
was evaluated against some well-known RFID attacks to discover whether or not it is strong against them.
In addition, the protocol was simulated with a special programming language named “the Scyther tool input
language” and evaluated using the Scyther protocol security analysis tool developed by Cremers1 . Then, it was
examined in terms of providing security services and compared with known authentication protocols.
Firstly, it is assumed that the attacker has the following abilities, access, information, and resources [35]:
1. The attacker can listen to all messages between the tags and the reader.
2. The attacker may block the transmitted data on the communication channel.
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3. The attacker may send a message to the other party as a tag or a reader.
4. The attacker has no access to hidden parameters, but can access all functions or operations, such as
PRNG, encryption, and XOR.
5. The attacker can process all transmitted messages, such as creating, modifying, and deleting them
and returning them to the communication channel.
4.1. Theoretical security analysis
The new protocol has been examined theoretically against known security attacks. During this investigation,
the protocol’s resistance to traceability, replay, physical disclosure, impersonation, desynchronization, denial of
service, man in the middle, cloning, and eavesdropping attacks were questioned.

4.1.1. Traceability attack
The traceability attack can be performed if the tag sends fixed responses to the reader. In GPAPXR+, to
prevent this type of attack, the tag adds the nonce value (N t ) to each message. N t is produced by a PRNG
“xorshiftR+” that passes NIST STS and TestU01 tests, as mentioned in the previous section. As well as the
addition of the N t value at the end of messages, the encrypted text and MAC value are also changed in each
message since nonce value is also added to the messages before encryption process. Therefore, the proposed
protocol includes defense against traceability attack. However, it is possible to find out the group to which the
tag belongs. In this case, any attacker who stores and sends a valid M1, nonce, and MAC value will receive a
response from any tag in the group, although it cannot associate responses with a specific tag. On the other
hand, the attacker will need to have k g and ID g values to calculate a valid M1 and MAC value. Moreover, the
attacker has to guess the used encryption algorithm.

4.1.2. Replay attack
It is assumed that an attacker could process or record messages transmitted during the successful authentication
process in this type of attack. At the same time, when an RFID reader issues a request, it is assumed that the
attacker can participate in the process instead of a valid tag. The attacker can attempt to intervene in this
process by resending the recorded information, but cannot recreate a valid M4 value. This is because M4 value
is encrypted, and N t value in M2, one of the values that make up M4, is continuously changing. Previous N t
values were saved on the server database so this attack will not be successful.

4.1.3. Physical disclosure attack
In this type of attack, it is assumed that the attacker can physically gain access to a tag that is a member of the
specified group, and the tag’s all hidden information. If an attacker can execute attacks such as traceability,
identity impersonation, or message repetition attacks, this attack is known as a physical disclosure attack. In
our proposed grouping proof authentication protocol, if the attacker is able to access the tag physically, it can
seize the hidden parameters of a tag, such as ID g , k g , ID t , and k t . Although M4 sent by other tags will be
decrypted using k g , the attacker will not be able to acquire the ID t information of other tags in the group,
because each tag encrypts its ID t with its own unique k t . Thus, the attacker can produce M4 for a fake tag
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with k g but it is not possible to authenticate this tag. In verification phase, M3 i is searched in the database.
This value is an encrypted text stored in database. Attacker cannot create a matching encrypted text for a
fake tag, so the proposed protocol is strong against physical disclosure attacks. It is not possible to threaten
protocol security by seizing hidden parameters of a tag.

4.1.4. Impersonation attack
In this type of attack, the attacker convinces the RFID reader that the received messages were sent by a valid
tag. On the tag’s side, the values of M3 and M4 are encrypted using AES algorithm. While the attacker needs
ID t and k t values to calculate and encrypt M3 value, to calculate M4 value it needs k g value in addition to M3.
Also, it cannot estimate the MAC value because of not having k t value; therefore, the tag cannot impersonate
the identity, and the protocol can resist this attack.

4.1.5. Desynchronization attack
Desynchronization attack can be done by ensuring that the sequence number in incoming packets differs from
the expected sequence number. Especially in cases where the parties use counters, mutual synchronization is
disrupted. Both sides do not have the same counter value. In the case of asynchrony, both communication
endpoints discard received packets. At this point, attackers can infiltrate the system and provide packages with
the correct sequence number. Attackers can even change or redirect communication.
In GPAPXR+ scheme, M4 and N t nonce values are taken by the reader and M4 i is created using N t
and the values stored on the reader side. N t value is also used to create M4. M4 value is encrypted data and
cannot be changed by the attackers. The invariance of M4 and other values is guaranteed by MAC. On the
other hand, there is not a counter to synchronize neither reader side nor tag side. Therefore, we can say that
the proposed scheme can resist desynchronization attacks.

4.1.6. Denial of service attack
Denial of service attack is an attack that the services of a computer, machine, or network device connected to
the Internet are blocked temporarily or permanently. The proposed protocol is not susceptible to the denialof-service attacks because it has resistance to desynchronization attacks. Reader and the tag are available to
accept communication all the time.

4.1.7. Man in the middle attack
Transferred data between the reader and the tag is encrypted by AES-256. The attacker has to break AES-256
encryption to apply man-in-the-middle attack. This is not possible.

4.1.8. Cloning attack
Cloning attack is not applicable for the proposed scheme because obtaining the tag ID is computationally infeasible under the AES-256.
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4.1.9. Eavesdropping
Attacker can listen to the communication between the tag and the reader but sent critical data is encrypted,
so attacker cannot estimate the plain text of that critical data.
4.2. Security analysis with the Scyther tool
The Scyther security analysis tool provides an interface to the user using the Python code infrastructure. This
interface allows the intended users to perform security analysis of the protocol and to understand the results
without difficulty. GPAPXR+ was tested using the Scyther tool. The Scyther tool has the ability to try
multiple attacks to the authentication protocols and shows the results of these attacks. Our Scyther tool model
examines three claims, namely Secret, Nisynch, and Niagree. These claims can be defined as follows: Niagree
is noninjective synchronization and ensures there is no interference in the content of the message exchanged
between the receiver and the sender and the communication is completed in the protocol. Nisynch guarantees
that communication packets are exchanged in the expected order, and also the run of the protocol is Niagree
[36]. “Secret claims” guarantee that the messages between the sender and the receiver are secret [37]. As a result
of the examination, it was determined that the protocol passed all the attack tests, as shown in the Scyther
tool result screen in Figure 32 . The Scyther tool results show that it is impossible to attack the authentication
operations in each layer; therefore, the authentication protocol is considered secure according to the Scyther
tool results.
4.3. Security service analysis
It is possible that within the interaction area of the reader, some tags do not belong to the corresponding group;
therefore, it is important to prevent the authentication protocol from including valid but unwanted tags in the
authentication process. First of all, our grouping proof protocol checks the membership of the tag. The reader
calculates M2 i = ID g ⊕ N t ⊕ N r and decrypts M4 value and calculates M4 i value. It calculates M3 i as M3 i
= M4 i ⊕ M2 i . Finally, M3 i is sent to the server, which searches for it in the database. If it does not belong
to the desired group, the server sends a reject message. This is the strategy in the proposed protocol to remove
valid but unwanted tags.
The new protocol has the ability to verify the identity of a number of tags in a group or subgroups,
called partial-proof. Partial-proof is performed on the server side. The server transfers the requested group
information to the RFID reader that sends the responses of the tags to the server, and runs the authentication
process. The server compares each tag in the desired group with the value of E (ID t , k t ) stored in the database.
Partial-proof is valid if the server can find the record of the desired group. Also, if one or more tags are separated
from the group, the server can run the authentication process based on the remaining tags. Thus, the proposed
protocol has the ability to perform the authentication for groups of one or more tags, regardless of the number
of tags in the groups.
The reader sends its encrypted group ID to the tag. Tag decrypts the sent ID and compares it with
the stored group ID. If they are equal, the tag authenticates the reader. On the other hand, the tag sends an
encrypted message to the reader. The reader decrypts the sent data and asks the server, if the server says that
everything is okay, the reader authenticates the tag and the mutual authentication process is completed.
2 DEU
CENG
SRG
(2020).
The
Scyther
tool
protocol
http://srg.cs.deu.edu.tr/publications/2020/gpapxr/. [accessed 28 May 2020]
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Figure 3. The Scyther tool results.

The proposed protocol resists the desynchronization and denial-of-service (DoS) attacks, so we can say
that the availability is maintained.
The tag ID and all critical data are sent to the reader encrypted, so it is confidential as breaking the
AES-256 encryption is computationally infeasible. We can say that confidentiality of tag anonymity, traceability,
location, and information privacy are maintained by that reason. The previous/current confidential information
cannot be compromised by the attacker because all critical data including the tag ID are transmitted as
encrypted text. Forward and backward security are maintained.
The transfer of ownership means that the new owner’s server has inherited the tag authorization; therefore,
the identity and the authorization must be transferred securely. In our scenario, authorization and other critical
information are stored in the server’s database. If this critical data is transferred to any other server, it means
that the ownership is transferred.
4.4. Comparison with the other authentication protocols
In our study, we identified comparison metrics as resisting security threats, providing security services, whether
grouping proof is present or not, have a PRNG passing well-known test suites, encryption function used, verifi3046
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cation method, whether implemented on a real device or not, and EPC compatibility. We created a comparison
table using these metrics. The protocols satisfying those metrics are detailed in Table 2. Information about the
protocols in reference studies shown in Table 2 is given under the section “Related work”. Security threats and
services are also evaluated in the table. Moreover, some well-known authentication protocols are given in that
table to compare with GPAPXR+. We can see that GPAPXR+ has resistance against traceability&tracking,
replay, physical disclosure, impersonation, desynchronization, DoS, man-in-the-middle, cloning, and eavesdropping attacks. Moreover, it supports mutual authentication, confidentiality, availability, forward&backward
security, ownership transferability, tag anonymity, and location&information privacy services.
GPAPXR+ uses AES to encrypt and decrypt the transmitted data. The protocol (GPAPXR+) was
tested and realized on WISP passive RFID tag and complies with the EPC Gen2 standards. Other protocols
provide various security services and resist attacks but GPAPXR+ stands out among them. GPAPXR+ was
implemented and tested on a real device. The other protocols given in Table 2 are mostly verified manually
or theoretically. GPAPXR+ uses a PRNG that passes NIST and TestU01 tests while none of the previous
studies in Table 2 has an evidence of using PRNG passing some strict tests. Some of the previous studies are
not compatible with EPC standards. Some protocols in the table are not suitable for grouping proof. Most
of the protocols in the table are not verified by a tool and they are verified theoretically. On the other hand,
GPAPXR+ is verified by Scyther tool and also it is verified theoretically. GPAPXR+ was implemented on
WISP passive RFID tag, but most of the other protocols were not implemented on a real device.
GPAPXR+ can use AES-128 or AES-256, so this is an important advantage in security. In GPAPXR+,
AES-256 was used because WISP passive RFID tags has built-in AES-256. For other devices, alternative secure
encryption algorithms can be used to encrypt the transmitted data. We can say that our protocol can use any
cryptographic algorithm to secure transmitted data and it already uses an encryption method such as AES.
For this reason, it is not recommended to be used in RFID tags that do not have the capacity to make secure
encryption.
There are also some disadvantages of the proposed protocol. GPAPXR+ protocol runs on fully fledged
devices. Therefore, it does not work on IoT devices that are not fully fledged. AES is used for encryption
processes. Other encryption algorithms can be used instead of this algorithm, but they will not work on devices
that cannot run an encryption algorithm. To generate a random number, they will need to produce seeds.
Therefore, they need a hardware entropy source to produce seeds.

5. Conclusion
This study presents a proposal for a solution on existing and pending security challenges on lightweight devices
in consideration of resource and time constraints. New solution is offered for authentication that is the important
point of security for lightweight devices. The WISP passive RFID tag was used as the lightweight device to
conduct tests and experiments. WISP passive RFID tag has built-in sensors, 256-bit AES encryption, and
can be programmed and therefore was selected for its high usability and applicability in the scope of future
technologies.
Previous authentication protocols were examined in the scope of this study, and group proof authentication protocols, capable of obtaining effective and flexible solutions under the desired resource limitations were
considered. This resulted in the development of the new group proof authentication protocol discussed in this
article. A secure solution is produced using WISP passive RFID tag’s built-in 256 bit AES encryption with this
new protocol and xorshifR+ is used for random number generation required for nonce values on both RFID
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Table 2. Comparison of authentication protocols.

[31] ✓ ✓ ?
?
?
✓ ✓ ?
✓ ?
✓ ?
✓ ✓ ?
✓ ✓ ?
X ✓ X ?
✓:Condition is fulfilled, X: Not fullfilled, ?: No information in the article, AES: Advanced encryption standard
ECC: Elliptic-curve cryptography, AE: Authenticated encryption, PKC: Public key cryptography

reader and RFID tag. This article describes the protocol’s structural design, phases, and process steps, and also
provides the security analysis of the protocol based on an evaluation of its effectiveness against known attack
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methods. Also, it is evaluated in terms of provided security services. In addition, protocol analysis is performed
by using the Scyther security analysis tool. It is observed that the protocol successfully prevents well-known
forms of attack.
GPAPXR+ was designed to resist many security threats and to perform many security services. It has
been implemented and tested on WISP passive RFID tag. Along with this, the working ability in different
environments and devices can be monitored for different types of attacks that may be encountered in the future.
It can also be run on different RFID tags, IoT devices, and can be tested with criteria such as time, security,
and resource usage.
Acknowledgment
This study is supported by The Scientific & Technological Research Council of Turkey (TÜBİTAK) with the
project number 215E225.
References
[1] Canniere CD, Dunkelman O, Knezevic M. KATAN and KTANTAN – a family of small and efficient hardwareoriented block ciphers. In: International Workshop on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems CHES
2009; Lausanne, Switzerland; 2009. pp. 272-288. doi: 10.1007/978-3-642-04138-9_20
[2] Knudsen L, Leander G, Poschmann A, Robshaw MJB. PRINTcipher: a block cipher for ic-printing. In: 12th
International Workshop Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems CHES 2010; Santa Barbara, USA; 2010.
pp. 16-32. doi: 10.1007/978-3-642-15031-9_2
[3] Guo J, Peyrin T, Poschmann A, Robshaw M. The led block cipher. In: 13th International Workshop Cryptographic
Hardware and Embedded Systems CHES 2011, Nara, Japan; 2011. pp. 326-341. doi: 10.1007/978-3-642-23951-9_22
[4] Gong Z, Nikova S, Law YW. A new family of lightweight block ciphers. In: Juels A, Paar C (editors) RFID. Security
and Privacy. RFIDSec 2011. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 7055. Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer, 2012. pp.
1-18. doi: 10.1007/978-3-642-25286-0_1
[5] Shibutani K, Isobe T, Hiwatari H, Mitsuda A, Akishita T et al. Piccolo:an ultra-lightweight blockcipher. In:
International Workshop on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems CHES 2011: Cryptographic Hardware
and Embedded Systems; Nara, Japan; 2011. pp. 342–357. doi: 10.1007/978-3-642-23951-9_23
[6] Wu W, Zhang L. LBlock: a lightweight block cipher. In: International Conference on Applied Cryptography and
Network Security ACNS 2011: Applied Cryptography and Network Security; Nerja, Spain; 2011. pp. 327–344. doi:
10.1007/978-3-642-21554-4_19
[7] Beaulieu R, Shors D, Smith J, Treatman-Clark S, Weeks B et al. The SIMON and SPECK families of lightweight
block ciphers. In: 2015 52nd ACM/EDAC/IEEE Design Automation Conference (DAC); San Francisco, CA, USA;
2015. doi: 10.1145/2744769.2747946
[8] Bogdanov A, Knezevic M, Leander G, Toz D, Varıcı K et al. SPON-GENT: a lightweight hash function. In:
International Workshop on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems CHES 2011: Cryptographic Hardware
and Embedded Systems; Nara, Japan; 2011. pp. 312-325. doi: 10.1007/978-3-642-23951-9_21
[9] Guo J, Peyrin T, Poschmann A. The PHOTON family of lightweight hash functions. In: Annual Cryptology
Conference CRYPTO 2011: Advances in Cryptology; Santa Barbara, CA, USA; 2011. pp. 222–239. doi: 10.1007/9783-642-22792-9_13
[10] Aumasson JP, Henzen L, Meier W, Naya-Plasencia M. Quark: a lightweight hash. Journal of Cryptology 2013;
26(2): 313-339. doi: 10.1007/s00145-012-9125-6

3049

AYDIN et al./Turk J Elec Eng & Comp Sci

[11] Lee JY, Lin WC, Huang YH. A lightweight authentication protocol for internet of things. In: 2014 International
Symposium on Next-Generation Electronics (ISNE); New York, USA; 2014. pp. 1-2.
[12] Özcanhan MH, Dalkılıç G. Mersenne twister-based RFID authentication protocol. Turkish Journal of Electrical
Engineering & Computer Sciences 2015; 23: 231-254. doi: 10.3906/elk-1212-95
[13] Armknecht F, Hamann M, Mikhalev V. Lightweight authentication protocols on ultra-constrained RFIDs-myths
and facts. In: International Workshop on Radio Frequency Identification: Security and Privacy Issues; 2015. pp.
1-18. Springer, Cham.
[14] Marsaglia G. Xorshift RNGs. Journal of Statistical Software 2003; 8(14): 1-6. doi: 10.18637/jss.v008.i14
[15] Vigna S. Further scramblings of Marsaglia’s xorshift generators. Journal of Computational and Applied Mathematics
2017; 315: 175-181. doi: 10.1016/j.cam.2016.11.006
[16] Çabuk UC, Aydın Ö, Dalkılıç G. A random number generator for lightweight authentication protocols: xorshiftR+.
Turkish Journal of Electrical Engineering & Computer Sciences 2017; 25(6): 4818-4828. doi: 10.3906/elk-1703-361
[17] Bassham LE. A Statistical Test Suite for Random and Pseudorandom Number Generators for Cryptographic
Applications. NIST Special Publication 800-22rev1a. Gaithersburg, MD, USA: NIST, 2010.
[18] Rukhin A, Soto J, Nechvatal J, Smid M, Barker E et al. A statistical test suite for random and pseudorandom number
generators for cryptographic applications. NIST Special Publication NIST SP 800-22 Rev 1a, Gaithersburg, MD,
USA: NIST, 2010.
[19] Barker E, Kelsey J. Recommendation for Random Number Generation Using Deterministic Random Bit Generators.
NIST Special Publication 800-90A. Gaithersburg, MD, USA: NIST, 2012.
[20] Turan MS, Barker E, Kelsey J, McKay KA, Baish ML et al. Recommendation for the Entropy Sources Used for
Random Bit Generation. NIST Special Publication 800-90B Second Draft. Gaithersburg, MD, USA: NIST, 2016.
[21] Barker E, Kelsey J. Recommendation for Random Bit Generator (RBG) Constructions. NIST Special Publication
800-90C Second Draft. Gaithersburg, MD, USA: NIST, 2016.
[22] L’Ecuyer P, Simard R. TestU01: A Software Library in ANSI C for Empirical Testing of Random Number Generators
User’s Guide Document. Montreal, Canada: University of Montreal, 2014.
[23] Cremers C. The scyther tool: verification, falsification, and analysis of security protocols. In: International Conference on Computer Aided Verification CAV 2008: Computer Aided Verification; Princeton, NJ, USA; 2008. pp.
414-418. doi: 10.1007/978-3-540-70545-1_38
[24] Rostampour S, Bagheri N, Hosseinzadeh M, Khademzadeh A. An authenticated encryption based grouping proof
protocol for RFID systems. Security and Communication Networks 2016; 9(18): 5581-5590. doi: 10.1002/sec.1718.
[25] İbrahim A, Dalkılıç G. An advanced encryption standard powered mutual authentication protocol based on elliptic curve cryptography for RFID, proven on WISP. Journal of Sensors 2017; 1: 1-10. Article ID 2367312. doi:
10.1155/2017/2367312
[26] Zhou Z, Liu P, Liu Q, Wang G. An ECC-based off-line anonymous grouping-proof protocol. In: Wang G, Atiquzzaman M, Yan Z, Choo KK (editors) Security, Privacy, and Anonymity in Computation, Communication, and
Storage. SpaCCS. Lecture Notes in Computer Science 10656. Cham: Springer, 2017, pp. 186-200. doi: 10.1007/9783-319-72389-1_16
[27] Liew WT, Tsai KY, Luo JN, Yang MH. Novel designated ownership transfer with grouping proof. In:
2017 IEEE Conference on Dependable and Secure Computing; Taipei, Taiwan; 2017. pp. 433-440. doi:
10.1109/DESEC.2017.8073863
[28] Zhang W, Qin S, Wang S, Wu L, Yi B. A new scalable lightweight grouping proof protocol for RFID systems.
Wireless Personal Communications 2018; 103: 133-143. doi: 10.1007/s11277-018-5430-1
[29] Zhou Z, Liu P, Liu Q, Wang G. An anonymous offline RFID grouping-proof protocol. Future Internet 2018; 10(2):
1-15. doi:10.3390/fi10010002

3050

AYDIN et al./Turk J Elec Eng & Comp Sci

[30] Tsai KY, Luo JN, Yang MH, Liew WT. Novel designated ownership transfer with grouping proof. Applied Sciences
2019; 9(4): 1-19. doi:10.3390/app9040724
[31] Luo JN, Yang MH. A Secure Partial RFID Ownership Transfer Protocol with Multi-Owners. Sensors 2020; 20(1):
1-18. doi: 10.3390/s20010022
[32] GS1. EPCTM Radio-Frequency Identity Protocols Generation-2 UHF RFID Specification for RFID Air Interface.
Lawrenceville, NJ, USA: GS1 EPCglobal Inc, 2013.
[33] EPCGlobal GS1. EPC™ radio-frequency identity protocols generation-2 UHF RFID specification for RFID air
interface protocol for communications at 860 MHz – 960 MHz version 2.0.1 ratified; 2015, pp. 1-152.
[34] Aydın Ö. Enhancing Security in RFID. PhD, Dokuz Eylül University, İzmir, Turkey, 2019.
[35] Dolev D, Yao A. On the security of public key protocols. IEEE Transactions on Information Theory 1983; 29(2):
198-208.
[36] Duan S, Mjølsnes SF, Tsay JK. Security analysis of the terrestrial trunked radio (TETRA) authentication protocol.
In: Norwegian Information Security Conference; Stavanger; 2013. pp. 1-12.
[37] Rathore R, Hussain M. Simple, secure, efficient, lightweight and token based protocol for mutual authentication
in wireless sensor networks. In: Shetty NR, Prasad NH, Nalini N (editors) Emerging Research in Computing,
Information, Communication and Applications ERCICA 2015. New Delhi, India: Springer, 2015, pp. 451-462. doi:
10.1007/978-81-322-2550-8_43

3051

